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We study firms’ advertising strategies in an oligopolistic market in which both non-
comparative and comparative advertising are present. We show that in equilibrium firms 
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increases relatively to non-comparative advertising as market competition intensifies. In-
terestingly, the use of comparative advertising may lead to higher consumers’ surplus and 
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1 Introduction
Comparative advertising, “the advertising that compares alternative brands on objectively
measurable attributes or price, and identifies the alternative brand by name, illustration or
other distinctive information”,1 is a widespread marketing practise met across various indus-
tries.2 According to empirical observations in the U.S. market comparative advertising rates
among 40% to 60% of total advertising (see e.g., Muehling et al., 1990; Pechmann and Stewart,
1990).3 Recent empirical evidence suggests that firms use both non-comparative and compar-
ative advertising to approach consumers (see e.g., Anderson et al., 2013, 2015; Liaukonyte,
2012). For instance, Liaukonyte (2012) shows that in the U.S. over-the-counter analgetics
market, Aleve devoted up to 90% of its total advertising in comparative ads and the rest in
non-comparative ads, while the proportions for its competitors, Advil and Tylenol, were 70%
and 26%, respectively. Consequently, one important question that a firm faces when it designs
its advertising strategy is whether it should launch both non-comparative and comparative
advertising campaigns and if so, what should be the optimal advertising mix.
The above questions have not been thoroughly addressed by the existing literature which
even though it has studied comparative advertising it has done so by focusing on its infor-
mative attributes and its signalling role (Anderson and Renault, 2009; Barigozzi et al., 2009;
Emons and Fluet, 2012). This paper contributes to the existing literature by studying the
firms’ advertising strategies in an imperfectly competitive market in which firms can launch
both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. In particular, we address the
following questions: Do firms have incentives to spend on both non-comparative and compar-
ative advertising and if so, which is the optimal advertising mix? How does the intensity of
market competition affect the firms’ expenditures on each type of advertising and their optimal
1Statement of policy regarding comparative advertising, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C., Au-
gust13, 1979.
2Typical examples of comparative advertising are, among others, the advertising campaigns of Subway that
point out the higher nutritional value of its products in comparison to the Mc Donald’s ones, the ”Get a Mac”
commercials of Apple that promote the capabilities, the security and the attributes of a Mac in comparison to
a PC, and the advertising battles of Pepsi and Coca Cola.
3Muehling et al. (1990) suggest that in the U.S. market almost 40% of all advertisements are comparative
in content. Pechmann and Stewart (1990) show that in the U.S. market 60% of all the advertising campaigns
contains indirect comparative claims, 20% contains direct comparative claims, and only the remaining 20%
contains no comparative claims.
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advertising mix? How does the presence of both types of advertising in a market affect market
outcomes and welfare in comparison to markets in which either one or both types are absent?
We consider a horizontally differentiated duopolistic market in which firms can use non-
comparative and comparative advertising to affect the consumers’ perception of the products’
qualities. Non-comparative advertising promotes the quality of own firm’s product. Therefore,
by increasing the consumers’ perceived quality, it shifts the firm’s demand outwards. Compar-
ative advertising instead has a push-me-pull-you dual effect (Anderson et al, 2015): Not only
it promotes the quality of the sponsoring firm’s product, but also, by presenting it as superior
to that of the rival’s, it decreases the consumers’ perceived quality of the targeted product.
Comparative advertising thus increases the firm’s own demand and decreases the demand of
the rival. A two stage game is analyzed in which firms decide first over the type(s) and the
intensity of their advertising campaigns and then they compete in quantities or prices in the
market.
We show that in equilibrium firms launch both non-comparative and comparative advertis-
ing campaigns.4 Our analysis reveals that within each firm non-comparative and comparative
advertising are strategic complements. Therefore, a firm optimally spends on both types of
advertising due to the marginal profitability of one type being increasing in the level of expen-
ditures in the other type of advertising. Further, we show that firms always spend more on
comparative than on non-comparative advertising. This is due to the nature of comparative
advertising. Evidently, comparative advertising is more appealing than non-comparative adver-
tising due to its’ push-me-pull-you dual effect. More importantly, as the competitive pressure
increases in the market, firms spend relatively more on comparative than on non-comparative
advertising. This finding indicates that in a more competitive market, firms adopt more ag-
gressive advertising strategies, since there is more pressure for each firm to improve its own
position and harm its rival’s. Further, this is in line with the empirical evidence that compara-
tive advertising is often met in highly competitive markets characterized by close substitutable
goods, such as the soft drinks industry and the over the counter analgetics market in U.S.
Interestingly, equilibrium non-comparative and comparative advertising intensities are U-
shaped in the degree of products’ substitutability. In addition, the comparative advertising
4This result is in line with recent empirical evidence that suggest that oligopolistic firms use both non-
comparative and comparative advertising in order to promote their products (see, e.g., Anderson et al., 2013,
2015; Liaukonyte, 2012).
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intensity starts increasing for lower values of the degree of product substitutability than the
non-comparative one. Intuitively, two opposing effects are in action: The demand effect and
the strategic effect. The first effect arises because as the products become closer substitutes,
each firm’s demand decreases and thus its incentives to spend on advertising become weaker.
The second effect, the strategic effect, captures the fact that closer products’ substitutability
translates into fiercer market competition, that reinforces the firm’s incentives to spend on
advertising so as to retain its market share. Clearly, when the products are poor substitutes,
an increase in the degree of product substitutability decreases the advertising intensities, since
the strategic effect is relatively weak and it is dominated by the demand effect. Exactly the
opposite holds when the products are closer substitutes. Further, the comparative advertising
intensity starts increasing in lower values of product substitutability, because, as already
mentioned above, firms spend relatively more on comparative relative to non-comparative
advertising as the competitive pressure in the market increases.
From a welfare perspective, our analysis indicates that the presence of both non-comparative
and comparative advertising in a market can be welfare-enhancing in comparison to a market
in which one or both types of advertising are absent. In fact, we show that consumers are
always better-off when firms launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising cam-
paigns. Although in the latter case firms’ profits are lower than in a market in which either
comparative or both types of advertising are banned,5 the higher consumers’ surplus quite
often offsets the lower profits, leading thus to higher welfare. In particular, a market with no
restrictions in advertising typically leads to higher welfare than a market in which advertising
is altogether banned (except if products are close substitutes and consumers’ ”quality con-
sciousness” is rather low).6 It also leads to higher welfare than a market in which comparative
advertising is banned whenever consumers are sufficiently quality conscious and products are
differentiated enough. Therefore, from a policy perspective our findings suggest that authori-
ties should carefully consider the specific features of a market before deciding whether to ban
or not the use of comparative advertising.7
5Clearly, a ban on comparative advertising campaign is beneficial for firms, because in a symmetric equilib-
rium each firm’s comparative advertising campaign is nullified by its rival’s one. Therefore, firms’ comparative
advertising campaigns constitute a clear loss, as firms bear the cost of advertising without enjoying any benefit
(i.e., comparative advertising expenses are wasteful).
6Emons and Fluet (2012), introduced the term quality consciousness.
7Stylized facts demonstrate that the discussion over the welfare effects of comparative advertising is still
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Our main results do not depend on whether firms compete in quantities or prices in the
market. It is worth noting that as the competitive pressure increases, as measured now by the
mode of competition, firms switch to more aggressive advertising strategies, i.e., they spend
relatively more on comparative than non-comparative advertising campaigns. Therefore, in a
more competitive market environment, measured either by the degree of product substitutabil-
ity or the mode of the market competition, the firms’ optimal advertising mix goes in favor of
comparative advertising. Nevertheless, the equilibrium advertising intensities are lower under
price than under quantity competition, since the marginal profitability of advertising is lower
under the fiercer price competition.
Our work contributes to the literature that studies comparative advertising in competitive
markets. Although there exists a large body of marketing literature that examines compara-
tive advertising (see e.g., Grewal et al., 1997, for a survey), the respective economic literature
is still scarce (e.g., Aluf and Shy, 2001; Anderson and Renault, 2009; Barigozzi et al., 2009;
Chakrabarti and Haller, 2011; Emons and Fluet, 2012).8 This literature has focused mainly on
the analysis of the informative and the signalling role of comparative advertising. Barigozzi et
al. (2009) consider a market in which an entrant, whose quality is unknown, decides whether
to use generic advertising (i.e., a standard money burning to signal quality) or comparative
advertising (i.e., a comparison to the incumbent’s quality which is known) to signal its qual-
ity. They show that comparative advertising can signal quality in instances where generic
advertising fails, provided that the use of comparative advertising enables the incumbent to
sue the entrant for manipulative advertising. Emons and Fluet (2012) examine the signalling
role of comparative advertising in a duopolistic market in which non-comparative advertising
discloses own firm’s quality, while comparative advertising discloses the quality differential of
the firms’ products. They show that in the presence of comparative advertising in the market,
firms never advertise together which may be the case when only non-comparative advertising
is present. In a somewhat related context, Piccolo et al. (2015) consider a vertically differen-
tiated duopoly in which the low quality firm can engage in deceptive advertising, potentially
fooling a consumer into thinking that the product is better than it actually is. They show that
active. More specifically, while comparative advertising was allowed in the U.S. in 1979, the E.U. allowed
comparative advertising only in 1997, with all EU member states harmonizing their policies by 2000 (Barigozzi
et al., 2009).
8This can be viewed as a branch of a wider literature considering quality disclosure in competitive markets.
See among others, Milgrom and Roberts (1986), Cheong and Kim (2004) and Hotz and Xiao (2013).
4
the consumer may benefit of such deceptive advertising and that stricter protection against
deceptive practices does not necessarily improve consumer welfare.
Anderson and Renault (2009) consider comparative advertising as information disclosure
for the horizontal match characteristics of the products. They show that if products are of
similar quality, comparative advertising plays no role, since firms provide full information for
their products. If, instead, products are of sufficiently different quality, the low quality firm
engages in comparative advertising and discloses the horizontal characteristics of both products
to improve its consumers base and survive in the market. The main differences to our setting
is that we consider that advertising is costly and that it influences the consumers’ perception
of the quality of the products.9 Lastly, Chakrabarti and Haller (2011) extends the literature
on comparative advertising by considering the n-firm oligopoly case in which firms decide not
only their investment levels in comparative advertising but also the target of their advertising.
They show that under perfect symmetry, investments in comparative advertising constitute a
net loss for both the firms’ performance and the welfare. The existing literature has mainly
dealt with the analysis of the firms’ decisions to use either non-comparative or comparative
advertising in a market. Our paper extends this literature by considering, instead, a setting in
which firms can launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. This
allows us to provide a detailed analysis on how firms mix over alternative advertising strategies
and how the latter affects market outcomes and social welfare.
In Section 2, we present our basic model. Section 3 includes the equilibrium analysis
and a comparison of our main results to those of a non-advertising, a mere non-comparative
advertising and a mere comparative advertising market. In Section 4, we discuss extensions of
our main model. Finally, Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
9Another strand of the literature considers the use of advertising to promote the horizontal characteristics
of products. Sun (2011), Koessler and Renault (2012), Jansseny and Teteryatnikova (2013) and Celik (2014)
analyze the incentives of firms to disclose their product characteristics focusing on horizontal differentiation.
We rather focus on the use of both non-comparative and comparative advertising to influence the consumers’
perception of the quality of the products.
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2 The Model
We consider a market that consists of two firms, each producing one brand of a horizontally
differentiated good. Each firm i, i = 1, 2, can launch both non-comparative and comparative
advertising campaigns to influence the consumers’ perception of the products’ qualities. A non-
comparative advertisement sends a positive message to consumers that promotes the quality of
firm i’s product. A comparative advertisement, in line with Anderson et al. (2015), conveys a
push-me-pull-you dual message to consumers presenting the sponsoring firm i’s product as of
superior quality to that of the rival firm j’s product. It thus increases a consumer’s perception
of the sponsoring firm’s product quality and decreases her perception of the rival’s product
quality.
On the demand side, there is a unit mass of consumers. The utility of a consumer depends
on her perception of the two products’ qualities, (τi, τj), and is given by,
U(τi, τj) = (a+ τis)qi + (a+ τjs)qj − (q2i + q2j + 2γqiqj)/2 + z, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j. (1)
where qi, qj , and z are respectively the quantities of goods i, j and the “composite” good
that the consumer buys. The parameter s > 0 measures the consumer’s valuation per unit of
(perceived) quality. The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the degree of product substitutability,
with γ → 0 corresponding to the case of almost independent goods and γ = 1 to the case
of perfect substitutes.10 Alternatively, γ can be interpreted as a measure of the intensity of
market competition, i.e., the higher γ, the fiercer the market competition.
A consumer’s perception of the quality level of good i can take values τi ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2};
in other words, good i can be perceived as of very low, low, standard, high and very high
quality, respectively. Prior to any firm’s advertising campaigns, all consumers are identical
and perceive the two firms’ products as of standard quality, i.e., τi = τj = 0.
11 Each firm can
influence a consumer’s perception by sending her a non-comparative ad (message mi) and/or
a comparative ad (message ci). Clearly, a consumer that receives no message by either firm
continues to believe that both products are of standard quality.
Consider first that only firm i sends ads. If a consumer receives only a message mi, she
perceives firm i’s product as of high quality (τi = 1). If a consumer receives only a message ci,
she perceives firm i’s product as of high quality and firm j’s product as of low quality (τi = 1
10In Section 5, we briefly discuss the case of complement goods (−1 ≤ γ < 0).
11This could be so e.g., because she assigns equal probabilities to all possible quality levels for each good.
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and τj = −1). If she receives both messages mi and ci, she perceives firm i’s product as of
very high quality and firm j’s product as of low quality (τi = 2 and τj = −1).12 Consider
next that both firms send ads. If a consumer receives messages ci and cj , the comparative ad
messages nullify each other, and thus τi = τj = 0. In fact, due to ci, the consumer perceives
firm i’s product as of high quality and firm j’s product as of low quality, which are however
offset by the exact opposite message that cj conveys. This leaves the consumer perceiving both
products to be of standard quality, τi = τj = 0. Further, if a consumer receives messages mi,
ci and cj , then, as the comparative ad messages nullify each other, the consumer ends up with
τi = 1 and τj = 0. Finally, if she receives all four messages, mi, ci, mj and cj , then τi = τj = 1.
Each firm i launches non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns with inten-
sities µi and κi, 0 ≤ µi, κi ≤ 1, respectively. The intensity of a campaign represents the
probability with which each consumer receives a respective ad. For instance, the probability of
a consumer not receiving any message from either firm is: (1− µi)(1− κi)(1− µj)(1− κj). To
compute firm i’s inverse demand function, we distinguish sixteen groups of consumers based
on the messages that each receives from the two advertising firms. Then the expected inverse
demand function of firm i is the weighted (by their respective probabilities) sum of the inverse
demand functions of the sixteen groups of consumers and is given by13
pi(.) = a+ (µi + κi − κj)s− qi − γqj . (2)
Observe that firm i’s demand increases in the intensity with which it launches comparative
and non-comparative advertising campaigns, κi and µi, and decreases in the intensity with
which its rival launches comparative advertising, κj .
We assume that the firms are endowed with identical constant returns to scale production
technologies, with their marginal production cost given by c, 0 ≤ c < a. Moreover, we assume
that the total cost of advertising is given by b(µ2i + κ
2
i ). It is separable across advertising
campaigns and quadratic in each type of campaign, i.e., there are diminishing returns of ad-
vertising expenditures. The parameter b denotes the effectiveness of the advertising technology
on shifting consumers’ demand, with a higher b corresponding to a less effective advertising
technology. As standard in the literature, the convexity assumption reflects that the cost of
12Note that our results remain qualitatively intact if we assume instead that a consumer that receives both
mi and ci, perceives the product of firm i as of high quality (τi = 1, instead of τi = 2). However, this alternative
assumption leads to unnecessary analytical complications.
13The derivation of firm i’s expected inverse demand function is presented in the Appendix A.1
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advertising is increasing in the number of targeted consumers (see, e.g., Butters, 1977; Gross-
man and Sharipo, 1984; Tirole, 1988; Hernandez-Garcia, 1997; Bagwell, 2007 and Hamilton,
2009).
A crucial modeling assumption is the separability of advertising costs. This is well docu-
mented in a recent strand of the managerial literature stressing that, due to the vast advances in
media technology, there is need for specialization in different advertising techniques applied by
the respective agencies. According to Horsky (2006), firms would prefer to use different agen-
cies to promote their products in different channels, based on their specialization. Arzaghi et
al. (2008) mention that advertising agencies in the US have moved from ”full service provider”
of advertising campaigns to providers of specialized services. Therefore, agency compensation
has moved from a proportional commission based on final number of targeted consumers to
”fee for service” provided by each agency. The main reason is that the complexity and interac-
tion among cotemporal media technologies have made it difficult to measure the final number
of targeted consumers (Nichols, 2013). Therefore, in our case, given the different handling
required for non-comparative and comparative ads, we treat the two types of advertising as
separate projects with independent costs.
Firms play a two stage game with observable actions. In the first stage, firms independently
and simultaneously decide their comparative and non-comparative advertising intensities. In
the second stage, firms compete in the market by setting their quantities.14
To simplify the exposition, we adopt the following normalizations: sn =
s
a−c and bn =
b
(a−c)2 . The parameter sn is a measure of a consumer’s valuation per unit of quality and per
unit of market size (as captured by a−c). The parameter bn measures the slope of the marginal
advertising cost per unit of market size squared.
In the sequel, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. bn ≥ 1/2 and sn ≤ ŝn(γ, bn), where ∂ŝn∂γ < 0, ∂ŝn∂bn > 0, ŝn(1, bn) = 0 and
limbn→∞ ŝn(γ, bn) =
1−γ2
(2+γ)(1+2γ) .
15
Assumption 1 is sufficient for the second-order and stability conditions to hold under all
cases. Moreover, it guarantees that the intensity of advertising does not exceed one, and
14In Section 4 we extend our analysis by examining price instead of quantity market competition.
15This is a sufficient condition in order to avoid corner solutions. In particular, ŝn(γ, bn) is the (real) solution
of the equation 2s2n[1− γ − (1 + 2γ)sn] = bn(4− γ2)[1− γ2 − (2 + γ)(1 + 2γ)sn]. If this condition fails to hold,
then a consumer receiving both non-comparative and comparative ads from firm i, and no ads from firm j, will
not buy a non-negative quantity of the firm j’s product.
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that all types of consumers buy non-negative amounts of both goods under all circumstances.
Moreover, it requires that the advertising technology is not too effective, i.e., marginal adver-
tising costs are sufficiently steep,16 and that advertising does not alter too much a consumer’s
valuation per unit of quality.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In the last stage, each firm i chooses its output to maximize profits
max
qi
Πi = [a+ (µi + κi − κj)s− qi − γqj − c]qi − b(µ2i + κ2i ). (3)
From the first order conditions, the reaction function of firm i is
Ri(qj) =
a− c− γqj
2
+
(µi + κi − κj)s
2
. (4)
Observe that an increase in firm i’s advertising expenditures shifts its reaction function
outwards, and therefore, tends to increase firm i’s output and (gross) profits. By contrast, an
increase in firm j’s expenditures on comparative advertising shifts firm i’s reaction function
inwards, tending to reduce its output and profits.
Solving the system of (4), the equilibrium quantities and profits are
qi(.) =
(a− c)(2− γ) + 2(µi + κi − κj)s− γ(µj + κj − κi)s
4− γ2 ; (5)
Πi(.) = [qi(.)]
2 − b(µ2i + κ2i ). (6)
In the first stage, each firm i chooses its advertising intensities, µi and κi, to maximize
profits Πi(.), taking as given the rival’s advertising intensities, µj and κj . The first order
conditions give rise to the following reaction functions of non-comparative and comparative
advertising (expressed in terms of sn and bn)
µi(.) =
2sn[2− γ + (2 + γ)(κi − κj)sn − γµjsn]
bn(4− γ2)2 − 4s2n
; (7)
κi(.) =
sn[2− γ − (2 + γ)κjsn + (2µi − γµj)sn]
(2 + γ)[bn(2− γ)2 − s2n]
. (8)
16As standard in the relevant literature, non-existence of an equilibrium may arise because a sufficiently low
advertising cost leads firms to savage advertising warfares that conclude to negative profits. Thus, advertising
restrictions are required in order all the participants to be active in the market (see, e.g., Peters, 1984; Bester
and Petrakis, 1995).
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An immediate observation is that the firms’ advertising intensities are strategic substitutes,
i.e., ∂µi(.)∂µj < 0,
∂µi(.)
∂κj
< 0, ∂κi(.)∂κj < 0, and
∂κi(.)
∂µj
< 0. This implies that an increase in firm j’s
advertising expenditures (either non-comparative or comparative) reduces firm i’s marginal
revenue from either type of advertising and thus weakens its incentives to spend on advertis-
ing. More importantly, we observe that within each firm non-comparative and comparative
advertising campaigns are strategic complements, i.e., ∂µi(.)∂κi > 0 and
∂κi(.)
∂µi
> 0. That is, an in-
crease in firm i’s expenditures on non-comparative advertising raises the marginal profitability
of its’ comparative advertising campaign (and vice versa). Intuitively, both non-comparative
and comparative advertising campaigns have a positive direct effect on firm i’s demand. In
particular, an increase in firm i’s non-comparative advertising intensity, by expanding firm i’s
demand, raises the marginal profitability of its comparative advertising campaign and thus
reinforces firm i’s incentives to spend on comparative advertising (and vice versa).
Solving the system of (7) and (8), the resulting equilibrium intensities in each type of
advertising are
µM =
2sn
bn(2− γ)(2 + γ)2 − 2s2n
; (9)
κM =
(2 + γ)sn
bn(2− γ)(2 + γ)2 − 2s2n
. (10)
Further, the equilibrium advertising ratio of non-comparative to comparative advertising,
namely the optimal advertising mix, is given by
M(γ) =
µM
κM
=
2
2 + γ
. (11)
The following Proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 1 i) In equilibrium firms launch both non-comparative and comparative adver-
tising campaigns, i.e., κM > 0 and µM > 0.
ii) The optimal advertising mix M(γ) < 1 for all γ > 0, with ∂M∂γ < 0.
iii) The equilibrium intensities of non-comparative and comparative advertising are U shaped
in γ, decreasing in bn, and increasing in sn.
Proposition 1 indicates that firms spend on both non-comparative and comparative adver-
tising. Intuitively, firms launch both types of advertising campaigns to exploit the different
effects that each type of advertising has on demand. That is, to increase their own demand by
raising the consumers’ quality perception of their products due to the self promoting attributes
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of both non-comparative and comparative advertising messages, and to decrease their rival’s
demand due to the denigrating effect of comparative advertising. Note however that this is
not the only reason for which firms spend on both non-comparative and comparative ads. As
the two types of advertising are strategic complements within each firm, a firm by spending
on one type of advertising raises the marginal profitability of the other type, and thus it has
incentives to launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns.
Interestingly, Proposition 1 informs us that the optimal advertising mix always favors
comparative instead of non-comparative advertising as long as the goods are horizontally dif-
ferentiated. This is due to the dual push-me-pull-you effect of comparative advertising. In fact,
a firm prefers to spend relatively more on comparative than on non-comparative advertising,
since the former not only increases its own demand, but it also decreases the demand of the
rival. More importantly, the optimal advertising mix decreases with the intensity of the market
competition, i.e., ∂M∂γ < 0. Intuitively, fiercer market competition (larger γ) creates pressure
to firms to adopt more aggressive advertising strategies. Clearly, as the market becomes more
competitive, a firm spends relatively more on comparative advertising in order to reduce the
demand of the rival (increasing at the same time its own demand).
Proposition 1 also indicates how firms adjust their advertising intensities as the market
competition becomes fiercer. In particular, both non-comparative and comparative advertising
intensities are U-shaped with γ.17 Note, however, that the comparative advertising intensity
starts increasing with γ for much lower values of γ than the non-comparative advertising
intensity. In more details, when the goods are poor substitutes, an increase in the competitive
pressure (higher γ) leads firms to decrease their advertising intensities, whereas the opposite
is true for goods that are closer substitutes. This is because there are two opposing effects in
action: the negative demand effect and the positive strategic effect. The demand effect captures
the fact that individual demands decrease with γ and as a consequence, firms’ incentives to
spend on advertising become weaker. On the other hand, the strategic effect captures the fact
that market competition becomes fiercer as γ increases, reenforcing thus the firms’ incentives
to spend on advertising in order to retain their market shares. Clearly, when the goods are
poor substitutes, the strategic effect is relatively weak and is dominated by the demand effect.
As a consequence, firms’ intensities in both types of advertising decrease with γ. The opposite
17It can be checked that ∂µ
M
∂γ
> 0 if and only if γ > 2
3
; and ∂κ
M
∂γ
> 0 if and only if 0 < γc(bn, sn) < γ < 1,
where γc(bn, sn) is the solution to γ(2 + γ)
2 =
s2n
bn
. Moreover, Assumption 1 implies that γc(bn, sn) <<
2
3
.
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is true when the goods are close substitutes, in which case the strategic effect dominates.
Moreover, since comparative ads become relatively more important as competition intensifies
(∂M∂γ < 0), it is clear that the strategic effect is stronger for comparative advertising and
overturns the demand effect for lower values of γ. Finally, the equilibrium intensities of both
types of advertising decrease with bn and increase with sn. As expected, as the advertising
technology becomes more effective, firms advertising intensities increase. The same is true
when the consumers valuation per unit of quality is higher, which is translated to higher
demands for the firms’ products.
Substituting (9) and (10) into (5) and (6), the equilibrium output and profits are
qM =
(a− c)bn(4− γ2)
bn(2− γ)(2 + γ)2 − 2s2n
; ΠM =
bn(a− c)2[bn(4− γ2)2 − (γ2 + 4γ + 8)s2n]
[bn(2− γ)(γ + 2)2 − 2s2n]2
. (12)
Proposition 2 i) Equilibrium output is decreasing in γ and bn, whereas it is increasing in sn.
ii) Equilibrium profits are decreasing in γ and sn, whereas they are increasing in bn.
Proposition 2 informs us that equilibrium output decreases as the products become closer
substitutes and the advertising technology becomes less effective, whereas it increases as the
consumers’ valuation per unit of quality increases. Intuitively, a less effective advertising
technology leads firms to spend less on both types of advertising, shifting inwards their reaction
functions, which results to lower equilibrium output. In addition, equilibrium output decreases
with γ, because the negative demand effect offsets the positive strategic effect. By contrast,
when consumers care more about the products’ quality, firms’ expenditures on both types of
advertising increase, resulting in fiercer market competition and higher equilibrium outputs.
Proposition 2 also indicates that equilibrium profits decrease as the products become closer
substitutes and the consumers’ valuation per unit of quality increases, whereas they increase
as the advertising technology becomes less effective. Clearly, as bn increases, competition in
both, output and advertising, is relaxed and profits increase. The opposite is true when the
consumers’ valuation per unit of quality increases. In fact, an increase in sn exacerbates the
advertising warfare, as measured by advertising intensities, with a negative backlash on profits.
3.1 The Role of Mixed Advertising Strategies
We turn now to examine how the presence of both non-comparative and comparative adver-
tising in a market affects market outcomes and social welfare. To do so, we consider three
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alternative market settings. First, a standard Cournot market without any advertising ac-
tivities: non-advertising market setting. Second, a market in which only non-comparative
advertising is present: mere non-comparative advertising market setting. This is a market in
which firms play the same game as in Section 2, with the only difference that κi = 0.
18 Third, a
market in which only comparative advertising is present: mere comparative advertising market
setting. This is a market in which firms play a game as the one described in Section 2, with
the only difference that µi = 0.
19 For notational reasons, we use superscripts N , I and C
to denote the equilibrium values under the Cournot, the mere non-comparative and the mere
comparative market settings, respectively. Comparing the equilibrium advertising intensities,
output and profits in a mix advertising market with the three alternative ones, we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 3 i) The equilibrium advertising intensities satisfy: µM = µI and κM > κC .
ii) The equilibrium outputs satisfy: qM = qI > qN = qC .
iii) The equilibrium profits satisfy: ΠI > ΠN > ΠM > ΠC .
According to Proposition 3(i), the equilibrium comparative advertising intensity in a mixed
advertising market always exceeds that of a mere comparative advertising market. This is
mainly a consequence of the fact that in a mixed advertising market comparative and non-
comparative advertising campaigns are strategic complements within each firm. As firms spend
positively on non-comparative advertising in a mixed advertising market (µM > 0), their
marginal profitability from comparative ads is higher than in a mere comparative market. By
contrast, the equilibrium non-comparative advertising intensity in a mixed advertising market
is equal to that in a mere non-comparative market. Strategic complementarity between the
two types of advertising within a firm in a mixed advertising market points towards higher
non-comparative intensity in the latter than in a mere non-comparative market. Yet, strate-
gic substitutability between the two types of advertising across firms in a mixed advertising
18This market setting corresponds to the case in which comparative advertising is prohibited by the law. It also
corresponds to the case where even if the country’s legislation allows for comparative advertising, comparative
advertising campaigns are banned due to accusations of being misleading and manipulative to consumers (see for
details, Barigozzi and Peitz, 2006; Barigozzi et al., 2009) and to the case where consumers perceive comparative
ads as manipulative, and thus as non trustworthy messages (see for details, Wilkie and Farris, 1975; Barone and
Miniard, 1999).
19Due to space limitations we provide the analysis of the three alternative market settings in Appendix A.3.
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market works in the opposite direction. The two forces exactly offset each other and the non-
comparative advertising intensities turn out to be equal in the mere non-comparative and the
mixed advertising markets.
Proposition 3(ii) indicates that equilibrium output is the same in a mixed and in a mere
non-comparative advertising market, and higher than that of a non-advertising and a mere
comparative advertising market. This is because in equilibrium, the firms’ comparative adver-
tising intensities are equal and thus neutralize each other. In addition, as we have seen above,
the equilibrium non-comparative advertising intensities are positive and equal in the mixed and
the mere non-comparative market (µM = µI > 0), which shifts the firms’ demands outwards
and results to higher equilibrium output than in the mere comparative and the non-advertising
markets.
Proposition 3(iii) informs us that firms obtain the highest profits in a mere non-comparative
advertising market and the lowest in a mere-comparative advertising market. Moreover, firms’
profits are higher in a non-advertising market than in a mixed advertising market. This result
is driven by two effects on a firm’s profits. The positive effect of advertising on a firm’s demand
and gross profits, and the negative effect of the advertising costs. It is straightforward that
a mere comparative advertising market yields the lowest firms’ profits, since in a symmetric
equilibrium any potential benefit from a firm’s spending on comparative advertising is nullified
by its rival’s one. Thus, firms enjoy no benefit and only bear the cost of advertising (i.e.,
comparative advertising expenses are wasteful).20 It is also clear that a mere non-comparative
advertising market yields the highest profits for the firms, as the shift in a firm’s demand due
to the self-promoting advertising more than compensates the cost of advertising. This, in turn,
implies that the firms’ profits in a non-advertising market, in which they are unable to promote
their products, are lower than in a mere non-comparative advertising market. Lastly, a mixed
advertising market yields lower profits for firms than a non-advertising market. This is due
to the fact that the increase in profits from their non-comparative advertising campaigns does
not compensate for the firms’ wasteful advertising expenditures in comparative advertising.
20The term ”wasteful advertising” was first introduced by Pigou (1924), in order to describe the prisoners’
dilemma which arises when competing firms in a market invest equal efforts in advertising in order to attract
the favor of the public from the others. As Pigou first showed, this concludes in a prisoners’ dilemma where
none of the firms gains anything at all.
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Turning our attention to the welfare implications and comparing consumers’ surplus and
total welfare in the aforementioned markets, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 4 i) CSM > CSC > CSN and CSM > CSI > CSN .
ii) SWM > SWC ; SWM > SWN except if γ is large enough and sn very small; SW
M >
SW I only if γ is small enough and sn is large enough.
According to Proposition 4, consumers are better-off when both types of advertising are
present in the market, whereas they are worse-off in the absence of advertising. It is clear that
in the presence of both non-comparative and comparative advertising in a market, a larger
fraction of consumers is exposed to the firms’ advertising messages and thus their perception
of the products’ quality increases.
Moreover, total welfare in a mixed advertising market always exceeds that of a mere com-
parative advertising market. This is because both firms’ profits and consumers’ surplus are
higher in the mixed than in the mere comparative advertising market. Interestingly, the welfare
is (typically) higher in a mixed advertising market than in a non-advertising one. There is a
small region of parameters, i.e., when products are close substitutes and consumers’ valuation
per unit of product’s quality is too small, in which the opposite holds. Consumers’ surplus is
higher, whereas firms’ profits are lower, in a mixed advertising than in a non-advertising mar-
ket. Then the higher consumers’ surplus dominates over the lower profits, except if advertising
hardly alters consumers’ perception of quality and market competition is fierce.
More importantly, total welfare in a mixed advertising market exceeds that of a mere
non-comparative market when the goods are rather poor substitutes and consumers are highly
quality conscious (for high sn). Here too, consumers’ surplus is higher, whereas firms’ profits are
lower, in the mixed advertising than in the mere non-comparative advertising market. When
consumers are sufficiently quality conscious (high sn) and market competition is rather soft
(low γ), the higher consumers’ surplus in the mixed advertising market dominates the higher
industry profits in the mere non-comparative advertising market. This is because when the
competitive pressure is weak, the difference in profits across the two market settings is small.
In addition, as sn increases, firms’ advertising intensities increase in both market settings. As
the fraction of consumers that are exposed to advertising messages in the mixed advertising
compared to the non-comparative advertising market increases with sn, so does the difference
in consumers’ surplus across the two market settings. Then for high enough sn and low enough
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γ, the profit differential is small and is dominated by the consumers’ surplus differential.
This is an interesting finding that adds to the discussion of the welfare effects of comparative
advertising. More precisely, it demonstrates that, whereas comparative advertising campaigns
can be detrimental to the firms’ profitability, they can improve total welfare as long as they
are launched together with non-comparative advertising campaigns (provided that consumers’
are sufficiently quality conscious).
4 Extensions-Discussion
Next we extend our basic model to examine the robustness of our main results and explore the
role of our assumptions.21
4.1 Bertrand Competition
In our basic model we have assumed that firms compete in quantities. We examine now what
happens if firms compete in prices. Under price competition each firm i faces the following
expected demand function,
qi(.) =
(1− γ)a+ (µi − γµj)s+ (1 + γ)(κi − κj)s+ γpj − pi
1− γ2
To guarantee well-behaved interior solutions under all circumstances, we make the following
assumption:
Assumption 1B. bn > 12 , γ ∈ [0, 0.76] and sn ≤ sn(γ, bn), with ∂sn∂γ < 0, ∂sn∂bn > 0,
sn(1, bn) = 0 and limbn→∞ sn(γ, bn) =
1−γ
2+3γ−2γ2 .
22
Note that stricter assumptions are required when firms compete in prices instead of quan-
tities. This is in line with Singh and Vives (1984) and is due to the fact that price competition
is fiercer than quantity competition.
We confirm that under price competition too, in equilibrium firms launch both non-
comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. The respective equilibrium advertising
21The detailed analysis of the extensions presented below is available from the authors upon request.
22Similarly to Cournot competition, sn(γ, bn) solves: (2− γ2)s2n(1− γ − sn − 2γsn) = bn(4− γ2)(1 + γ)[1−
γ− (2−γ)(1 + 2γ)sn], Then s ≤ sn(γ, bn) guarantees that consumers buy non-negative quantities of both goods
under all circumstances.
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intensities and optimal advertising mix are
µMB =
(2− γ2)sn
bn(2− γ)2(1 + γ)(2 + γ)− (2− γ2)s2n
κMB =
(2− γ)(1 + γ)sn
bn(2− γ)2(1 + γ)(2 + γ)− (2− γ2)s2n
MB(γ) =
µMB
κMB
=
2− γ2
(2− γ)(1 + γ)
Interestingly, the optimal advertising mix is lower under price than under quantity com-
petition, i.e., MB(γ) < M(γ) for γ > 0. That is, firms’ spending in comparative relatively
to non-comparative advertising are higher when market competition takes places in prices in-
stead of quantities. This finding reveals that the more competitive the market environment,
the more appealing the comparative advertising campaigns. Noting also that ∂MB∂γ < 0, we
conclude that an increase in competitive pressure, measured either by the degree of product
substitutability or the mode of the market competition, leads firms to a more aggressive adver-
tising warfare. In particular, firms choose a more aggressive mix of advertising strategies, i.e.,
higher comparative relatively to the non-comparative advertising intensities. Note however
that the advertising intensities are lower under price than under quantity competition. This
is because the rentability of sending messages are lower under the fiercer price competition.
We confirm that our main results hold also when firms compete in prices.23 The only excep-
tion is that the equilibrium intensity in non-comparative advertising is decreasing (instead of
U-shaped) in γ. This is because market competition is now fiercer and firms substitute away the
less aggressive non-comparative advertising campaigns with the more aggressive comparative
ones.
4.2 Complementary Goods
Throughout our analysis we have assumed that firms produce substitute goods. We discuss
now what would happen in case of complementary goods, i.e., γ ∈ [−1, 0) where γ = −1
captures perfect complementarity. Note that the analysis is the same as in Section 3, with γ
now taking negative (instead of positive) values.
Surprisingly, in this case too firms launch both comparative and non-comparative adver-
tising campaigns. However, the optimal advertising mix in this case favors non-comparative
23For more details see Alipranti et al. (2016).
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advertising, i.e., M(γ) > 1 for −1 ≤ γ < 0 (see (11)). In particular, when goods are comple-
ments firms spend less on comparative than in non-comparative advertising campaigns. This is
because in the case of complementary goods, the push-me-pull-you effect of comparative adver-
tising has a different nature. In particular, the ”pull you” effect of comparative advertising has
adverse implications for the advertising firm. This is because a decrease in the consumers’ per-
ceived quality of the rival’s product, and therefore a decrease in the rival’s demand, decreases
also the demand of the advertising firm. This makes comparative advertising less attractive
in case of complementary goods, and thus firms spend relatively more on non-comparative
advertising than under substitute goods.
In light of this, it is not surprising that, contrary to the case of substitute goods, when
goods are complements firms’ profits in a mix advertising market are typically higher than in
a non-advertising market, i.e., ΠM > ΠN except if the goods are weak complements (γ close to
0). This is because the optimal advertising mix favors non-comparative instead of comparative
advertising, and therefore the positive effect of advertising on firm’s demand and gross profits
more than compensates the negative effect of the advertising costs. Accordingly, we find that
SWM > SWN always holds in this case, as both the consumers’ surplus and the firms’ profits
are higher in a mixed advertising than in a non-advertising market. The rest of our findings
are qualitatively the same as in the case of substitute goods.
4.3 Advertising Cost Asymmetries
We performed our analysis so far under the assumption that the costs of the non-comparative
and comparative advertising campaigns are the same. However, in reality when a firm invests in
comparative advertising, it runs the risk of being prosecuted to the courts by the rivals and to be
accused for misleading advertising.24 Motivated by the latter, we examine what happens when
the cost of comparative advertising exceeds that of non-comparative advertising. Assuming
that the cost of comparative advertising is dκ2i , where d = tb with t > 1 and keeping all the
other features of our model intact, we reconfirm that the firms’ optimal mix of advertising
favors comparative instead of non-comparative as long as t is sufficiently small (t < 2+γ2 ).
We also confirm that our main results do not qualitatively change when comparative is more
24For instance, in 2000 Papa John’s was forced by the court to pay over 468.000$ in damages to Pizza Hut
due to the advertising campaign ”Better ingredients. Better pizza” that has been judged as misleading, since
such claims can not be proved (see for details, Barigozzi and Peitz, 2006; Barigozzi et al., 2009).
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expensive than non-comparative advertising.
5 Concluding remarks
We analyzed firms’ advertising strategies in a duopolistic market in which firms can launch
both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. We also studied the market and
societal implications of the presence of both types of advertising in the market in comparison
with markets in which one or both types of advertising are absent due, e.g., to legal restraints.
We found that in equilibrium, firms spend on both non-comparative and comparative ad-
vertising. A central contribution of our analysis is that firms’ advertising warfare intensifies
when firms are able to launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns.
In particular, firms spend relatively more on comparative than on non-comparative advertising.
Most importantly, the higher the competitive pressure (as measured by either the degree of
product substitutability or the mode of market competition), the higher the share of compar-
ative advertising in the chosen mix of both competitors. This finding highlights that a more
competitive market environment makes the aggressive comparative advertising strategy more
attractive than the traditional self-promoting non-comparative one.
Regarding the welfare implications, we find that a blend of advertising types always ben-
efits consumers, i.e., consumers’ surplus takes its highest value when firms launch both non-
comparative and comparative advertising campaigns. In addition, a mixed advertising market
often leads to higher welfare than markets in which one or both types of advertising are not
present. More specifically, it leads to higher welfare than a market in which firms can launch
only non-comparative advertising campaigns, i.e., in markets in which comparative advertising
is either banned or mistrusted by consumers, as long as products are sufficiently differentiated
and consumers are highly concerned over the products’ quality. Although the use of compar-
ative advertising is detrimental to the firms’ profitability (i.e., firms’ profits are lower in the
presence than in the absence of comparative advertising), firms’ spending on comparative ad-
vertising campaigns can improve not only the consumers’ surplus but also the social welfare as
long as they are launched together with non-comparative advertisements. An important pol-
icy implication of our analysis is that the regulator should not ban comparative advertising,
especially when its objective is maximize consumers’ surplus.
Our analysis leads to a number of testable implications. First, we should observe that
19
firms launch both non-comparative and comparative advertising campaigns in horizontally
differentiated industries with few firms endowed with similar production technologies. Second,
if the risk of being prosecuted to the courts by the rivals and to be accused for misleading
advertising is rather small, we expect firms to spend relatively more on comparative than
on non-comparative advertising. Finally, we should observe dissimilar reaction patterns of
advertising expenses to an increase in the industry competitive pressure. In particular, in
highly competitive markets, i.e., markets with a high degree of product substitutability, we
should observe a positive relationship between competitive pressure and advertising expenses.
Whereas the opposite is expected to occur in markets with low competitive pressure.
In contrast to common wisdom, we found that comparative advertising campaigns are
used even when firms’ products are complementary, although with relatively lower intensity
compared to non-comparative advertising. This is due to the dual, pull-me-push-you, role of
comparative advertising, i.e., it is used by each firm to promote, along with non-comparative
advertising, its product quality to consumers. Of course, in this case a different type of
advertising, e.g., an individual firm’s advertising campaign over the bundle of the products,
seems to be more appropriate. Whether firms still use comparative advertising in the presence
of the latter type of advertising is left for future research.
Appendix
A.1 We present here how we derive firm i’s expected inverse demand function. First, as
described in Section 2, we distinguish sixteen groups of consumers, n = 1, 2, ..., 16, based on
the messages that a consumer receives from the two advertising firms. The share of each
group in the market, ρn, is given by the respective probability with which a consumer receives
messages from the firms. Thus, the expected inverse demand function of firm i is the weighted
(by their respective probabilities) sum of the inverse demand functions of these sixteen groups
of consumers. In the following we present the share of each group of consumers in the market
(stated in the column, ρn) and its respective inverse demand function (stated in the column,
pni (τi, τj)).
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ρn pni (τi, τj)
(1− µi)(1− µj)(1− κi)(1− κj) a−qi−γqj
(1− µi)(1− µj)(1− κi)κj a−s− qi−γqj
(1− µi)µj(1− κi)(1− κj) a−qi−γqj
(1− µi)µj(1− κi)κj a−s− qi−γqj
(1− µi)(1− µj)κi(1− κj) a+s− qi−γqj
(1− µi)(1− µj)κiκj a−qi−γqj
(1− µi)µjκi(1− κj) a+s− qi−γqj
(1− µi)µjκiκj a−qi−γqj
µi(1− µj)(1− κi)(1− κj) a+s− qi−γqj
µi(1− µj)(1− κi)κj a−qi−γqj
µiµj(1− κi)(1− κj) a+s− qi−γqj
µiµj(1− κi)κj a−qi−γqj
µi(1− µj)κi(1− κj) a+2s− qi−γqj
µi(1− µj)κiκj a+s− qi−γqj
µiµjκi(1− κj) a+2s− qi−γqj
µiµjκiκj a+s− qi−γqj
pi=
∑16
n=1 ρ
npni (τ i, τ j) =a+(µi+κi−κj)s− qi−γqj
A.2 We present now how we derive consumers surplus and social welfare under mix adver-
tising. In equilibrium, we have: pi = pj = p
M , qi = qj = q
M , µi = µj = µ
M , and κi = κj = κ
M .
Hence the inverse demand function (2) can be rewritten as: pM = a+ µMs− (1 + γ)qM , and
thus qM = a−p
M
1+γ +
µMs(1−γ)
1−γ2 .
Let τi and τj be an individual consumer’s perceived quality for firm i’s and firm j’s products,
respectively. Her consumer surplus cs(xi, xj , τi, τj) is given by
U(xi, xj , τi, τj)− pMxi − pMxj
= [(a+ τis)xi + (a+ τjs)xj − (x2i + x2j + 2γxixj)]/2− pMxi − pMxj
where xi and xj denote the quantity of the product i and j that this consumer buys, respec-
tively. As the firms’ prices are equal in equilibrium, the first order conditions of the individual
consumer’s utility maximization can be written as: a+τis−xi−γxj = a+τjs−xj−γxi = pM .
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Solving the latter system of equations, and using the expression obtained above for qM , we
have
xi(τi, τj) =
a− pM
1 + γ
+ s
τi − γτj
1− γ2 = q
M + s
τi − γτj − µM (1− γ)
1− γ2 , i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
Further, using the first order conditions above, the individual consumer’s surplus can
be written as: cs(τi, τj) =
1
2 [x
2
i (τi, τj) + x
2
j (τi, τj) + 2γxi(τi, τj)xj(τi, τj)]. Moreover, since
xj(τj , τi) = xi(τi, τj), then cs(τi, τj) = cs(τj , τi). Hence, we can summarize the sixteen types of
consumers into six groups with (τi, τj) being respectively, (0, 0), (1, 0), (1,−1), (2,−1), (2, 0)
and (1, 1), where the first element corresponds to any of the two products that is perceived
(weakly) better than the other. It follows that consumers’ surplus is the sum of the surplus of
these groups weighted by their respective probabilities of appearance in the market:
CSM = [(1− κM )2 + (κM )2](1− µM )2cs(0, 0)+(µM )2[(κM )2 + (1− κM )2]cs(1, 1)
+2(1− µM )2κM (1− κM )cs(1,−1) + 2κMµM (1− κM )(1− µM )cs(2,−1)
+2(µM )2κM (1− κM )cs(2, 0) + 2µM (1− µM )[1− κM + (κM )2]cs(1, 0).
After some manipulations, consumers surplus is given by
CSM =
(a− c)2[b2n(1− γ)(4 + 4γ − γ2 − γ3)2 + 2bn(2 + γ)2(6 + 3γ − γ2 − γ3)s3n − 2s4nΦ(.)]
(1− γ2)[bn(2− γ)(2 + γ)2 − 2s2n]2
where Φ(.) = 6(1 + sn) + 2γ(4 + 3sn) + γ
2(5 + 2sn) + γ
3. Total welfare is then, SWM =
CSM + 2ΠM .
A.3 Non-advertising. This is the standard Cournot market with horizontally differentiated
goods. Solving each firm’s maximization problem, given in (3) after setting µi = 0 and κi = 0,
the equilibrium output and profits are, qN= a−c2+γ and Π
N= (a−c)
2
(2+γ)2
. Further, consumers surplus
and total welfare are, CSN=(1 + γ) (a−c)
2
(2+γ)2
and SWN=(3 + γ) (a−c)
2
(2+γ)2
.
Mere Non-Comparative Advertising. In this case firms can use only non-comparative adver-
tising. Solving each firm’s maximization problem, given in (3) after setting κi = 0, the equilib-
rium advertising intensity, output and profits are, µI= 2sn
bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n , q
I = (a−c)bn(4−γ
2)
bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n
and ΠI = (a−c)
2bn[bn(4−γ2)2−4s2n]
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2 . Further, consumers surplus and total welfare are,
25
CSI =
(a− c)2[b2n(1− γ)(γ3 + γ2 − 4γ − 4)2 + 2bn(2− γ)(2 + γ)2s3n − 4s4n(1 + sn)]
(1− γ2)[bn(2− γ)(2 + γ)2 − 2s2n]2
,
25CSI is obtained following the same steps as in the mixed advertising case. Here there are only three types
of consumers characterized by (τi, τj) being (0, 0), (1, 0) and (1, 1). Their respective probabilities of appearance
are (1− µI)2, 2µI(1− µI) and (µI)2.
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SW I = CSI + 2ΠI .
Mere Comparative Advertising. In this case firms can use only comparative advertis-
ing. Solving each firm’s maximization problem, given in (3) after setting µi = 0, the equi-
librium advertising intensity, output and profits are, κC = sn
bn(4−γ2) , q
C = a−c2+γ and Π
C =
(a−c)2[bn(2−γ)2−s2n]
bn(4−γ2)2 . Further, consumers’ surplus and total welfare are,
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CSC =
(a− c)2[b2n(2− γ)2(1− γ2)− 2s4n + 2bn(4− γ2)]
b2n(1− γ)(4− γ2)2
,
SWC = CSC + 2ΠC .
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1 : i)+ii) As M(γ) =µ
M
κM
= 22+γ6 1, κM > µM for all γ > 0.
Further, ∂M(γ)∂γ = − 2(2+γ)2 < 0.
iii) By differentiating µM and κM with respect to bn, sn and γ, we obtain:
a) ∂µ
M
∂bn
= − 2(2−γ)(2+γ)2sn
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2
< 0 and ∂κ
M
∂bn
= − (2−γ)(2+γ)3sn
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2
< 0
b) ∂µ
M
∂sn
= 2bn(2−γ)(2+γ)
2+4s2n
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2
> 0 and ∂κ
M
∂sn
=
bn(2−γ)(2+γ)3+2(2+γ)sn
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2
> 0
c) ∂µ
M
∂γ =
2bn(2+γ)(2−3γ)sn
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2
> 0 if and only if γ > 23 ; otherwise
∂µM
∂γ < 0
d) ∂κ
M
∂γ =
2sn(bnγ(2+γ)
2−s2n)
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2
> 0 if and only if bn >
s2n
γ(2+γ)2
; otherwise ∂κ
M
∂γ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 2 : i) By differentiating qM with respect to bn, sn and γ, we obtain:
∂qM
∂bn
= − bn(a−c)(4−γ2)s2n
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2 < 0;
∂qM
∂sn
= bn(a−c)(4−γ
2)sn
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2 > 0 and
∂qM
∂γ = − bn(a−c)[bn(4−γ
2)2−4γs2n]
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]2 <
0
ii) By differentiating ΠM with respect to bn, sn and γ, we obtain:
∂ΠM
∂sn
= − 2bn(a−c)2snΩ
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]3 < 0, with Ω ≡ bnγ(2− γ)(8 + γ)(2 + γ)
2+2(8 + γ(4 + γ))s2n
∂ΠM
∂γ = − 2bn(a−c)
2snΞ
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]3 < 0, with Ξ ≡ b
2
n(4− γ2)3−2bn(2 + γ)2(2− γ2−4γ)s2n−2(2 + γ)s4n
∂ΠM
∂bn
= (a−c)
2s2nΩ
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)2−2s2n]3 > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 : i) First, we observe that, µM = µI ; second,
κM − κC = 2s3n
bn[bn(2−γ)2(2+γ)3−2(4−γ)s2n]
> 0; thus κM > κC .
26CSC is obtained following the same steps as in the mixed advertising case. Here there are only two types
of consumers characterized by (τi, τj) being (0, 0) and (1,−1). Their respective probabilities of appearance are
(1− κC)2 + (κC)2 and 2κC(1− κC).
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ii) We observe that, qM = qI ; qN = qC and qM − qC = 2(a−c)s2n
bn(2−γ)(2+γ)3−2(2+γ)s2n
> 0; hence,
qM = qI > qN = qC .
iii) ΠI − ΠN = 4(a−c)2s2n[bn(1−γ)(2+γ)2+s2n]
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)3+2(2+γ)s2n]2
> 0; ΠN − ΠM = (a−c)2s2n[bnγ(8+γ)(2+γ)2+4s2n]
[bn(2−γ)(2+γ)3+2(2+γ)s2n]2
> 0
and ΠM − ΠC = 4(a−c)2s2n[b2n(1−γ)(4−γ2)2(2+γ)2−bn(12−γ2−γ3)+s
4
n]
bn[bn(2−γ)2(2+γ)3−2(4−γ2)s2n]2
> 0; hence, ΠI > ΠN > ΠM >
ΠC .
Proof of Proposition 4 : i) First, taking the following differences, CSM −CSI and CSM −
CSC , we find that they are always positive. Second, taking the differences CSI − CSN and
CSC−CSN we observe that they are always positive. ii) First, taking the following differences,
SWM − SWC , we find that it is always positive. Second, taking the difference SWM − SW I ,
we observe that it is positive if and only if γ is small enough and sn > s˜n(γ, bn).
27 Finally,
taking the difference SWM − SWN , we observe that it is positive except if γ is large enough
and sn is sufficiently close to zero.
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